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The aim of this paper is to critically examine the axiom of Cooper and McLeod 
(2011) that the person-centered approach should incorporate pluralistic practices based 
on clients’ goals and wants. First, we examine Cooper and McLeod’s argument that the 
uniqueness of clients means that therapeutic work should orientate around helping 
clients to identify what they want and how to achieve it. Second, we examine their 
position that the theories that the therapist may hold about therapeutic change should be 
subordinate to the client’s specific wants and needs. Finally, we consider their assertion 
that there is a need to reconceptualise person-centered theory with a pluralistic 
framework. The person-centered approach has its own unique ontological position 
based on a trust in the actualizing tendency of all organisms. If by pluralism McLeod 
and Cooper are proposing ontological eclecticism, then this is fundamentally 
incompatible with the person-centered approach. In terms of method, the person-
centered approach was already pluralistic; if this is what McLeod and Cooper (2011) 
mean by pluralistic, then what they are proposing is simply old wine in a new bottle.   
 











 Recent years have seen much interest in pluralistic therapy. In 2011, Cooper and 
McLeod proposed a pluralistic approach to person-centred therapy. They describe a 
pluralistic standpoint as the prioritization of the therapist’s responsiveness to the client’s 
goals, wants and needs. What this means is that it is of primary importance to identify 
the client’s goals, wants and needs and for the therapist to be flexible in their ways of 
working to help clients achieve these goals, wants and needs. They argue that to have a 
‘person-centered understanding of therapeutic change’ (p.210) necessarily means being 
open and appreciative of the many different ways that clients may benefit from therapy, 
including practices outside of the person-centered orientation. Translating such an 
understanding to practice, they suggest that therapists should hence specifically 
orientate therapeutic work towards clients’ goals and facilitate a discussion with the 
clients about the different tasks and methods to achieve them.  
 Cooper and McLeod (2011) claim that their framework helps person-centered 
and experiential therapists to avoid having a judgemental attitude toward other 
therapeutic orientations and become ‘champions of inclusivity and mutual respect 
across therapies’ (p.220). They also see this as a framework to reconceptualise person-
centered therapy (PCT) that offers a means to resolve the tension between commitment 
and anti-dogmatism, which they identified as a problem while citing Hutterer (1997). 
However, Hutterer’s work may have been misrepresented as he has explicated that both 
anti-dogmatism and a commitment to a philosophy of human relationships are crucial 
aspects of the person-centered approach. The tension between them is not the problem 
in itself. Rather it is the unbalanced solutions to this tension that lead to a disorientation 
of the person-centered approach, such as distorting the approach into a set of 
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unrecognisable techniques in the name of being anti-dogmatic. Hutterer recognises that 
to resolve this tension requires a reflective approach involving a deep understanding and 
critical appraisal of Rogers’ theory, but an unreflective approach, together with the 
pressure to accommodate instrumentalism, may cause therapists who are not strongly 
grounded in the person-centred philosophy to turn to eclecticism. In this paper we will 
argue that this is exactly what Cooper and McLeod (2011) have done in proposing a 
pluralistic approach to person-centered therapy. 
 Cooper and McLeod (2011) argue; first, that the person-centered approach 
emphasizes prizing the uniqueness of each individual. Therefore, it is necessary for 
person-centered therapists to be appreciative and open to many different ways that 
clients may benefit from therapy. They hence suggested a goal-task-method framework 
to work with clients. Second, they reasoned that the central beliefs of the person-
centered approach imply that individuals’ wants and needs have precedence over 
theories that the therapist holds about their approach. They advocated for a stance of 
flexibility where person-centered theories and practices should be held lightly because 
different clients benefit from different types of therapy. Thus, in place of holding a 
central hypothesis about human nature and therapeutic change to guide therapeutic 
work, they advocated for a pluralistic perspective in person-centered therapy which is to 
orientate therapeutic work around client’s goals.     
 As such, in their suggested model, therapists’ tasks involve helping clients to 
identify what are their goals and the ways they want to achieve them, which they 
claimed are highly-consistent with the person-centered approach. They contend that the 
pluralistic perspective, where the therapist practices flexibly to incorporate different 
methods and theories, is congruent with what Rogers described as a characteristic of 
being more fully functioning; i.e., not rigid in constructs and being a more ‘integrated 
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process of changingness’ (Rogers, 1961, p158) and allows the person-centered 
practitioner to grow more fully as a therapist. In the following sections, we will explore 
the validity of Cooper and McLeod’s (2011) claims and arguments through a closer 
examination of person-centered theory. We will show that the pluralistic perspective is 
incompatible with the person-centered approach, and there is no necessity for the 
current person-centered theory to incorporate such a perspective into practice. First, we 
will examine Cooper and McLeod’s (2011) argument that the uniqueness of clients 
means that they are likely to benefit from different therapeutic methods at different 
times and therefore therapeutic work should orientate around helping clients to identify 
what they want and how to achieve it. Second, we will examine their proposition that 
the theories that the therapist may hold about therapeutic change should be subordinate 
to the client’s specific wants and needs. Finally, we will critically review their assertion 
for a call to reconceptualise person-centered theory from a pluralistic perspective.  
 
The Uniqueness of Individuals and its implications on Practice  
Cooper and McLeod (2011) argued that it is important for person-centered therapists to 
recognise that individuals are likely to benefit from different therapeutic methods at 
different times and therefore therapeutic work should orientate around helping clients to 
identify what they want and how to achieve it. In their suggested ‘goal-task-methods 
framework’, therapists would get involved with an explicit meta-communication with 
the clients about setting goals and specify the ‘tasks’ which refers to the macro-level 
strategies to achieve the goals, and finally to plan ‘methods’, which are the activities for 
both the client and therapist to do in order to complete the tasks. They explained that 
this is a negotiation process, as therapists will also bring their own opinions to negotiate 
with the client if they do not think what the client wants is helpful, suggesting that the 
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therapist will take up an expert role at these times. They also recommended using forms 
for clients to indicate preferences, such as whether they prefer the therapist to be gentler 
or offer more confrontation, or whether to focus on the emotions or the cognitive 
processes. These discussions then serve as an orientating point to the ongoing 
therapeutic work.  
 We agree that the person-centered approach denotes the view of the human 
being as a unique person, but we disagree that this would lead to a pluralistic way of 
working such as integrating different therapeutic approaches or varying the therapists’ 
way of being as Cooper and McLeod suggest. Rather, the consequence of the client’s 
uniqueness is the realization that the clients are entirely different persons in their own 
right, and to truly accept another person means to acknowledge them as a true Other 
(Schmid, 2002a, 2013). Here, the Other is written with a capital letter as an encounter-
philosophical term. Denoting that the client as a true Other means acknowledging that 
the client cannot be truly known or fully comprehended and can only be acknowledged 
and empathised with. The Other cannot be manipulated through various methods and 
techniques to achieve a certain outcome or behaviour. Relating to the client as a person 
in their own right is directly opposed to objectification, where the human being is 
denoted like a machine which can be fully grasped and understood and eventually be 
manipulated through external intervention. A commitment to respecting the Other as a 
true Other means that not only should we not be the expert for the client, but also 
recognizing that we cannot be the expert (Sommerbeck, 2004).  
 As such, the movement in a person-centered therapeutic relationship starts from 
the client to the therapist, where the client discloses themselves, while the therapist tries 
to acknowledge and empathise, denoted in a Thou-I relationship rather than an I-Thou 
relationship (Schmid, 2002b, 2006). This view of the human being as a person then 
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necessarily precludes objectification of the client and all the accompanying 
implementations of the objectification, which informs the therapist’s way of being to be 
one of non-manipulative, non-evaluative and non-expert. It is due to this view of the 
human being that person-centered therapists do not take the expert role and offer 
interpretations, advice or analyse the clients simply because in any given moment the 
client expresses a want for it.  
 Building from this epistemology of acknowledging the ‘Other’,  Schmid (2006) 
clarified that person-centered therapy is dialogical; instead of trying to grasp knowledge 
of the client to fit in to what therapists know, the therapists are to be fully present to the 
client, to co-experience with the client and to encounter the client on a person to person 
basis and risk being changed themselves in this encounter. In PCT, dialogue is not a 
means to an end to negotiate goals and direction of the therapy, so that therapists can 
decide what interventions to offer. Rather, PCT is dialogue from beginning to the end of 
therapy, where therapists are ‘challenged to do nothing else than to be present in the full 
meaning of the word’ (Schmid, 2006, p.252). Meanwhile, the focus on what clients 
wants and orientating the therapeutic process based on their goals, reduces the full 
extent of the client as a person to merely the client’s immediate wants and goals. Rather 
than a person to person encounter, therapeutic work becomes a transaction, like a 
service provider fulfilling what customers want. Such a ‘transactional’ method is very 
different to the dialogical understanding of person-centered therapy.  
  In summary, the argument that person-centered therapists should be open to 
work with different ways to suit the client due to the valuing of the client as a true 
Other, does not hold and reduces person-centred therapy to being less than dialogue. 
When clients are perceived as a true Other, it certainly means that a therapist will not 
work in ways that objectify clients, such as applying methods that maintain a therapists’ 
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power and expert role over the clients. The therapist’s task is not about setting goals 
with the clients and working out the methods to achieve these goals but to perceive and 
understand who the client is, as a person, in the moment-to-moment experiential world. 
Thus, prizing the uniqueness of the Other does not mean to practice in whatever manner 
the client perceives they want or need, or to orientate therapeutic practices specific to 
clients’ goals. It means to appreciate the client as a person, respecting their autonomy 
and as worthy to be acknowledged and accepted just as they are, whilst also holding the 
potential for what they may become. It implies rejecting all methods and stances that 
continue to emphasize the perception of the client as an object, even when the client 
wants methods or evaluations that denote themselves as an object. It is the 
acknowledgement of each individual as a unique Other that informs a certain way of 
being for the therapist, i.e. the experiencing and communication of the facilitative 
conditions of congruence, unconditional positive regard and empathic understanding.   
 
Should Client’s Wants and Needs Precede the Ontological Position of the Person- 
Centered Approach?  
Cooper and McLeod (2011) contend that at the ‘heart of a person-centered approach’ 
p.214), is the understanding that the theories that the therapist may hold about 
therapeutic change should be subordinate to the client’s specific wants and needs. They 
suggest that therapists respond in a way that clients want, by adjusting the therapeutic 
conditions of a facilitative relationship or choosing more technique-orientated 
approaches. They maintain that they are not calling for person-centered therapists to be 
integrative, but argue that a pluralistic form of practice is actually based on person-
centered ethics. They suggest that therapists who adopt such a pluralistic practice are 
being ‘person-centred about person-centred therapy’ (Cooper & McLeod, 2011, p.220) 
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as they are not being rigid in constructs and embrace fluidity. In a personal online 
communication with Mick Cooper, he shared the following:  
 
a pluralistic perspective would not assume that the core conditions are 
sufficient or necessary for all clients because that would be pre-empting 
what every client need. Rather, from a pluralistic standpoint – and 
consistent with empirical evidence- what we might say is that the core 
conditions may make a very important contribution to change to some 
(perhaps many) clients, some (perhaps much) of the time.’ (Personal 
communication over email, 10/01/2019, shared with permission from Mick 
Cooper)  
 
However, what Cooper and McLeod (2011) seem to misunderstand is that the 
person-centered approach has a distinct anthropological, epistemological, 
developmental psychological position which cannot be combined with any other 
orientation (Schmid, 2002a). It is this that is actually the ‘heart of person-centered 
therapy’, and it is the ontological position that informs the therapist’s way of being with 
the client.  
The ontological position of the person-centered approach refers to the 
underlying image of the human being as a proactive person driven by the actualizing 
tendency, such that clients are trusted to be their own best experts. Rogers argued that 
the actualizing tendency ‘exists in every individual and awaits only the proper 
conditions to be released and expressed’ (Rogers, 1961, p.351), and is the sole 
motivational force of the organism (Rogers, 1963a). This actualizing tendency denotes 
that the person moves in a constructive direction for both their own individuality as well 
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as for their interconnectedness with others. As such, the basic nature of the human being 
is trustworthy. When a human being is functioning freely, their behaviour will be 
constructive, both individualized and socialized (Rogers, 1966). As such, PCT is about 
facilitating the freedom of the individual to be fully themselves; there is no need for 
control or external forces as the individual’s behaviour would already be appropriate to 
the ‘survival and enhancement of a social animal’ (Rogers, 1961, p.194). In other 
words, people can be trusted to grow constructively on their own, given sufficient 
portions of the right socio-environmental conditions of facilitative relationships. Thus, 
PCT is the experiencing of the therapeutic conditions which are the qualities of a 
facilitative relationship, and through this, the clients are hypothesized to experience 
more unconditional positive self-regard, have a more internal locus of evaluation and 
have their behaviour based more on their organismic valuing process instead of 
conditions of worth (Rogers, 1959).   
Thus, by suggesting that client’s wants and needs should be given precedence 
over the theories that therapists hold about them, Cooper and McLeod (2011) imply that 
the therapist can shift their orientations, to have a fluid belief on the ontology of their 
practice, to fit into clients’ preferences and wants. To assimilate a pluralistic perspective 
into PCT implies the notion of how the therapist must step away from one ontological 
position to another to suit the client’s wants and needs. In stepping away from the 
ontological position that clients are their own best experts, such as integrating methods 
which denotes the therapist as the expert, it would mean that the therapist is no longer 
working in a person-centered way. To incorporate a pluralistic practice that does not 
have a clear differentiation of ontological positions of different practices, where 
therapist’s behaviour is dependent on what the client wants, implies a confusing and 
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misguided position of therapists’ way of being in therapy. For example, integrating 
different therapeutic practices may bring about the following contradictions:  
 
1) For some clients, at some point of therapy, they may be seen as having 
an inherent actualizing tendency and can be trusted grow without 
needing any expert intervention, while at another point be seen as not 
trustworthy and requiring expert interventions and guidance.  
2) For some clients, the therapist empathises with the internal 
phenomenological world of the client, while for others, the therapist 
gives an external evaluation and explanation of the client.  
3) For some clients, the therapist holds unconditional positive regard for 
the client, allowing the client to be as they are with no judgements and 
evaluations, while for other clients, the therapist holds conditional 
regard to manipulate the client towards their once expressed goal.  
4) Some clients are denoted as a person, where the therapist engages 
genuinely on a person-to-person basis, while others are denoted as an 
object, where the therapist hides behind a mask of professionalism or 
expertism. 
 
We argue that it is simply not possible to have a pluralistic ontological position 
on human nature (Murphy, 2014). There is no theoretical underpinning of how 
therapeutic approaches, based on fundamentally different understandings of what is real 
in human nature, can be integrated at an ontological level (Wood & Joseph, 2007). 
Furthermore, giving the client what the client wants, while it may initially be pleasing to 
the client, is not consistent with the overarching goals of PCT - which at the level of 
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theoretical abstraction refers to fostering the process of connection to the organismic 
valuing process. Without a sound resolution of integrating different ontological 
positions, it seems that Cooper and McLeod’s (2011) invitation for the therapist to hold 
person-centered theories and practices ‘lightly’, seems to come from a reductionistic 
view on PCT as just a response repertoire without considering its ontological 
assumption. They appear to have assumed that PCT only adheres to a certain way of 
responding and rigidly refrains from using other techniques even when the client wants 
it.  
Having a pluralistic ontological positioning does not mean that the therapist is 
being ‘person-centered about person-centered therapy’ (Cooper & McLeod, 2011, 
p220); neither does it mean that the therapist is being more fluid and less rigid to 
constructs like a more fully functioning person as they suggest. When Rogers delineated 
the process of becoming ‘an integrated process of changingness’ (1961, p.158) and the 
fully functioning person (1963b), he clearly did not mean to encourage therapists to 
adapt and change themselves and their own ontological position to whatever the client 
prefers or needs. Rather, when therapists are able to move towards becoming a process 
and fully-functioning, it means that they are more open to their own organismic 
experiences and are not denying their own feelings to themselves or the clients. 
Corollary to this, they would likely have more willingness to let the clients be whoever 
they are and move in any direction they want to go and would likely be non-directive as 
there is less need for defence or use of any expertise to direct the clients. It certainly 
does not mean to offer what the client wants; that would be a more rigid stance as it 
implies that sometimes therapists may deny their own inner experiencing or even deny 
the client’s experiencing in that immediate moment in order to satisfy previously 
decided wants and goals.  
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Two examples of this are the ‘Therapy Personalisation Form’ as suggested by 
Cooper and McLeod (2011b) and the more recent Cooper-Norcross Inventory of 
Preferences (C-NIP) (Cooper & Norcross, 2016) where clients are asked to indicate 
their preferences on how they want their therapist to behave. They advocated that 
therapists should vary their style of relating based on client’s preferences. This practice 
runs a very serious risk of therapists not being able to be congruently themselves in the 
session while they try to behave in the ways that client’s want, which might run 
contrary to who they truly are as persons. As such, the suggested form of pluralistic 
practice by Cooper and McLeod (2011) does not help therapists to be ‘person-centered 
about person-centered therapy’, rather it is advocating for the sacrifice of the therapists’ 
congruence to satisfy client’s wants.  
It is because of the trust in human beings as unique individuals that consequently 
defines the characteristics of the PC therapist to be non-directive to create room for the 
tendency towards actualization (Lietaer, 2002. Schmid, 2005). It is, therefore, flawed 
logic to deduce from the same premise that since all individuals are unique, some 
people will benefit from a non-directive approach where the client is the expert while 
others need methods that rely on the therapist as the expert. Once therapists assume the 
role of an expert, they also abandoned trust in the client’s capability and responsibility 
for constructive self-actualization (Patterson, 2000). Similarly, empathising with the 
client while ensuring that our regard for the client is unconditional, and being real, not 
hiding behind a façade, are logical consequences of truly believing in the hypothesis of 
the actualizing tendency in the client (Schmid, 2002a). Rogers (1975) emphasized that it 
is this ‘uncompromising trust in the growth processes of individuals’ (p.1843) that 
serves as a theoretical base for PCT. It is illogical to abandon the theoretical foundation 
of the person-centered approach because clients have unique wants and needs. This 
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argument would only be valid if we believe that the actualizing tendency is non-
universal.  
 In summary, appreciating that every person is a different, unique Other, does 
not imply that we should discard theories that are formulated about the commonalities 
of being human. Schmid (2003) proposed that PCT is based on the ‘We’ perspective 
where both commonality and difference are valued equally, we cannot ignore the aspect 
that we are all living in the same context of relationships, subjected to the same 
conditions of being human. It also does not imply that we should shift our hypothesis 
about human beings through the session, trying to ‘fit’ the client’s wants. Rogers called 
this ‘confused eclecticism’ (Rogers, 1951, p.24) which would only confuse the client 
and block scientific progress, as therapists would never know if their hypothesis is true, 
which in the case of PCT, it is the hypothesis of the actualising tendency as the main 
motivational force in individuals, where growth is ensued in an optimal relational 
climate of genuineness, unconditional positive regard and empathic understanding. He 
has argued that only by ‘acting consistently upon a well-selected hypothesis that its 
elements of truth and untruth can become known’ (Rogers, 1951, p.24). By disregarding 
a consistency with the ontological position of the person-centered approach, the 
pluralistic perspective is hence, incompatible with PCT. 
 
Is there a necessity to reconceptualise PCT with a pluralistic perspective? 
Finally, the proposal that a pluralistic approach adds something new to the 
person-centered approach is unfounded. Cooper and McLeod (2011) cite Worsley 
(2001) as inviting therapists to move away from ‘dogmatic person-centredness’ but it is 
misleading to view, and a misappropriation of, Worsley’s writings as supporting their 
pluralistic approach. Unlike Cooper and McLeod (2011), Worsley believed that 
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therapeutic work needs to be consistent with the basic principles of the primacy of the 
actualizing tendency and the assertion of the necessity and centrality of the therapeutic 
conditions. Rogers’ (1957) six necessary and sufficient conditions was an integrative 
statement about psychotherapy practice that allows for a range of methods to be used by 
therapists in order to further communicate and facilitate the client’s perception of the 
relationship conditions. Rogers’ (1957) statement was never meant to be a call for every 
therapist to respond in the same way without accounting for individuals’ differences as 
what Cooper and McLeod (2011) have implied. Rather, Rogers (1957) was making the 
exact opposite point. 
However, there is no room for the pre-conceived use of methods or techniques 
which is not rooted in the context of the immediate experience of the relationship. 
Rogers (1966) described congruence as, ‘the therapist encounters his client directly, 
meeting him person to person. He is being himself, not denying himself’(pg.185). The 
only ‘tool’ that is employed is the therapist’s own self as a person. Offering whatever 
the client wants based on previously stated metacommunication or form filling such as  
‘be more challenging or be gentler’,  ‘allow more silence or not so much silence’ 
(Cooper & McLeod, p.219) may ignore the therapists’ own self and hence their ability 
to be congruent in the relationship. Rather, the therapists’ behaviour in the therapy 
session is based on the moment-to-moment empathy of the client’s experience as well 
as the therapists being in touch with their own experiencing in that moment; therapists’ 
behaviours is never used as a tool in order to meet client’s wants. It is also not possible 
for a person-centered therapist to consider a pluralistic position where they are 
sometimes being themselves as a person, and sometimes not, hiding behind the façade 
of being an expert.   
 16 
A way to describe unconditional positive regard is how fully the client is being 
acknowledged for who they are, a true separate Other, appreciating they cannot be 
comprehended with all their uniqueness. The therapist does not offer evaluation or 
attempt to gain knowledge over the client but to simply acknowledge and respond to 
whatever the client chooses to reveal and disclose in the moment. The 
metacommunication on goals-tasks-methods puts the focus on gaining knowledge of 
what the client wants without encountering the client on a person to person basis. 
Pluralistic therapy in this sense is to take a step further away from the client and reduces 
therapist presence. Deciding that the discussion on goals, tasks and methods as 
necessary and comes before meeting the client demonstrates a lack of trust in clients to 
be their own experts. Levitt (2005) argues that any attempt by the therapist to direct the 
client to focus on aspects other than the immediate experience of the relationship, the 
positive regard is no longer unconditional, and the therapist has placed a condition of 
worth on the client, which in this case is the condition that the client needs to think 
about goals and work towards these goals in therapy. 
Rogers (1966) sees the communication of empathic understanding as the main 
ongoing work for the person-centered therapist and sees this as central in effecting 
therapeutic change. This implies that the therapist’s job is to co-experience with the 
client on the moment-to-moment basis, not to create new experiences outside of the 
client’s immediate phenomenal field (Schmid, 2002b). As Rogers stated, 
 
‘the client-centred therapist aims to remain within this phenomenal universe 
throughout the entire course of therapy and holds that, stepping outside it- to 
offer external interpretations, to give advice, to suggest, to judge- only retards 
therapeutic gain.’ (Rogers, 1966, p.190)  
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Rogers (1966) emphasized that the therapist’s accurate empathic understanding 
is of primary value only if it is based on the moment-to-moment sensitivity of the 
client’s experience in the immediate present. This implies the recognition that the client 
‘is always a process, never static, fixed or finished’ (Schmid, 2008, p.95). Any 
evaluative understanding, such as checking if a goal has been achieved, tends to focus 
the client to look at himself from an external frame of reference and remove the client 
from the ongoing experience within himself.  
Cooper and McLeod’s (2011) claim that the focus on client’s goals is being 
highly consistent with the person-centered approach is highly erroneous considering the 
above-discussed focus of the client’s phenomenal world in PCT. They suggested that 
the identified goals served as an orientating point for the therapeutic work, but this 
overlooks the fact that the client is in a flowing process and not a fixed state with fixed 
goals to work with. The client’s phenomenal world is constantly changing, and it would 
be a mistake to focus on those certain goals previously discussed and limit the client’s 
freedom if these goals are not based in the client’s immediate experiencing at that 
moment. Rogers described how the client tends to drop these fixed goals in therapy, he 
states ‘He (client) tends, in the freedom of the therapeutic relationship to drop such 
fixed goals, and to accept a more satisfying realization that he is not a fixed entity, but a 
process of becoming’ (Rogers, 1961, p.122).  
Furthermore, this idea assumes that the client would already know what they 
want and is ready to discuss how to work towards it early in the therapy. PCT should be 
a process of working alongside the clients as they find out what is important to them, 
not asking them to decide what they want early in the therapy. As Rogers stated, 
‘therapy is diagnosis, and this diagnosis is a process which goes on in the experience of 
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the client’ (Rogers, 1951, p. 223), which is why empathic understanding is so central 
and the relationship conditions are proposed as necessary and sufficient.  
This is not to say that therapists need to refrain from talking about goals in PCT. 
A therapist can focus on goals, tasks and methods if that is what the client chooses to 
bring at that moment. For example, if the clients’ immediate phenomenal field includes 
a desire to learn a breathing technique that the therapist happens to know, the therapist 
can share what they know or practice it with the client if appropriate as an expression of 
empathy to the client. The process would still always be directed and owned by the 
client, and the values and benefits are to be assessed by the client (Brodley & Brody, 
1996). When this is no longer relevant in the client’s phenomenal field, the therapist 
does not need to purposely go back to ask how the client feels or evaluate the process 
but to continue to co-experience what is in the immediate next moment.  
Despite Cooper and McLeod’s (2011) assertion that pluralism is based on 
person-centered values, we want to explicate the fundamental differences between the 
pluralistic approach and the person-centered approach. The pluralistic approach 
proposed by them is essentially goal-centered and not person-centered, even though the 
goals might be set by the clients. In the person-centered approach, therapists of course 
recognise that clients might benefit from other approaches or activities outside of 
therapy, however, the discussion of this might or might not be the focus in therapy as it 
depends on whether the client chooses to bring it. Person-centered therapists do not see 
that it is their responsibility to provide what the clients want or to take up the position to 
offer interventions to help the clients reach their goals as they believe in the clients’ 
own actualising tendency to flourish in a climate of facilitative conditions within the 
relationship of a person to person encounter. To take that responsibility to provide the 
client something they want is to undermine the process of clients’ growth and the 
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development of trust in themselves and perpetuates the notion that the therapist is the 
expert. To assume responsibility is not to bring something extra to the therapy but it is 
to take something away from the client. The idea of ‘being with’ clients captures the 
flavour of what person-centered therapists do in therapy, rather than ‘working on’ or 
‘providing for’ clients in a goal-centered approach. Rogers (1975) emphasized that in 
PCT, the clients are perceived and valued as self-responsible individuals, capable of 
making their own discoveries and decisions, and not ‘objects for treatment’ (p.1832). 
Person-centered therapists perceive the client as a true Other, and thus engage in a 
person-to-person encounter, staying in the client’s frame of reference and 
phenomenological experiences without stepping away from it (Rogers, 1966). 
Meanwhile, a goal-centered approach such as the pluralistic approach edges closer to a 
provider-to-customer relationship, where the client decides the therapist’s orientation. 
Unlike a goal-centered approach, the person-centered approach is less concerned about 
outcomes of goals, achievement, or fulfilment of wants. Rather, it is about emancipation 
of the person to becoming who they truly are, where clients can learn to trust 
themselves and their organismic valuing process and be self-directing to choose their 
next goals or directions they want to go.  
It is through the process of PCT that the client becomes more able to trust 
themselves and their organismic valuing process and be self-directing. The pluralistic 
approach of Cooper and McLeod (2011) seems to assume that clients have this ability 
sufficiently from the outset. But it is axiomatic to the person-centered approach that 
they don’t; the client ‘is in a state of incongruence’ (Rogers, 1957). Clients will often 
‘want’ to be treated conditionally. They may look to the therapist to assume power over 
them, to ‘medicalise’ their condition for them, or to blame them for misfortune, for 
example. The therapist needs to be fully attentive to the wholeness of the 
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phenomenological world of the client, aware of the tensions between expressions of a 
tendency towards actualisation and those of a conditional self-concept, and be able to 
follow the client empathically moment by moment, with unconditional regard. It is in 
meeting the client ‘unconditionally’ that their conditions of worth dissolve. PCT is 
about the often gradual and difficult process of movement towards discovering one’s 
goals, wants, and needs. For the therapist to put the onus on clients to articulate these 
from the outset is therapist-centered and steps outside the person-centered paradigm. It 
is in metaphorical terms ‘putting the cart before the horse’. To follow the client moment 
by moment in an empathic, unconditionally regarding, and genuine way, which can 
involve responding to expressions of what the client wants, is being person-centered. 
This is however a more subtle and sophisticated dialogical process of understanding and 
responding. 
As such, there is no requirement for an additional pluralistic perspective to 
reconceptualise person-centered theory as PCT is already pluralistic (Schmid, 2002a), 
although not in the way that Cooper and McLeod have described. The client comes first 
and, is viewed as the expert, while the therapist responds by being present moment-to-
moment in an idiosyncratic way. This idiosyncrasy needs to be operating with a trust in 
the actualizing tendency of the client and includes the experiencing and communication 
of the relationship conditions of congruence, empathic understanding and unconditional 
positive regard. This is consistent with the non-negotiable primary principles that define 
what is person-centered as set out by Sanders (2000/2004). In this sense, PCT is even 
more fluid than the framework suggested by Cooper and McLeod as in PCT, we do not 
assume that the client would benefit from a goal-orientation or a metacommunication 
about goals, yet we do not exclude these if these are what the client chooses to bring up 
in therapy at that moment. Thus, there is no necessity to reconceptualise PCT with a 
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new pluralistic perspective as Cooper and McLeod (2011) suggested. To do so would be 
to place a restriction around the unbounded potentiality inherent in the PCT 
relationship, as it would prioritise the therapist’s and client’s focus to be concerned with 
the needs, wants and goals.  
 
Conclusion  
We have shown how the idea of pluralistic practice as suggested by Cooper and 
McLeod (2011) where the therapist is required to adopt and integrate different theories 
and practice to suit what the client wants or goals is fundamentally incompatible with 
PCT. First, it is not possible to combine different ontological positions without stepping 
away from the fundamental assertion that the client is their own best expert. What stays 
consistent is the therapist’s trust in the client’s actualizing tendency and the inherent 
prosocial nature of human beings; it is this that informs the therapist’s way of being. 
Second, there is no requirement for a reconceptualization of what it means to be person-
centered with a pluralistic perspective, as PCT has always been pluralistic at the level of 
the therapist’s response and behaviour in therapy that are idiosyncratic expressions of 
the relationship conditions. If this is what McLeod and Cooper (2011) mean by 
pluralistic, then what they are proposing is simply old wine in a new bottle.  If, as seems 
more likely, by pluralism they are proposing ontological eclecticism then this is simply 
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